tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31783628.post5993532904624992342..comments2011-12-30T18:07:33.230-05:00unemployed negativityhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01251742512967070290noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31783628.post-39986970082233047402011-12-30T18:07:33.230-05:002011-12-30T18:07:33.230-05:00Right, okay, I think I get it a lot more now. So Severac is rejecting the idea of alienation completely, and replacing it with Canguilhelm's theory of norms? If so, that definitely makes a lot of sense. I can't remember what I was thinking before. By the way, I apologize if it's inappropriate to solicit you to explain this stuff to me, but I found it extremely interesting. I'd really like to read that link to the Severac thing, but I have no French, and Google Translate only created a "close but no cigar" kind of situation.Joel Gliddenhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17537995617381460013noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31783628.post-19569868457073397792011-12-23T13:12:48.180-05:002011-12-23T13:12:48.180-05:00Contrary to what Hegel thought determination is not negation, every thing, every modal thing is determined. A thing is defined as much by its affects as its striving, its joyful and sad affects. There is a difference between its auto-determination and its determination by others. This is the only difference that Severac allows. What he rejects, and argues is not Spinozist, is any distinction between virtual and actual, between a things potential and actuality. Everything is always actualized.unemployed negativityhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01251742512967070290noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31783628.post-83317439255282255332011-12-22T18:02:41.225-05:002011-12-22T18:02:41.225-05:00The Severac thing is interesting, but to me it seems much less "Spinozist" than, say, Negri or Deleuze, and in Spinoza's philosophy in general. I still don't really fully grasp Spinoza's ontology or metaphysics, but I understand it as being that there's negation of an individual essence insofar as an individual is determined, which I think Spinoza said himself specifically in a letter somewhere. Does Severac see affects of joy as being part of an individual's existence, but sad affects are not "part" of the individual in some way? And if so, then wouldn't that be a big deviation of Spinoza's ideas? (I've only read The Ethics, Practical Philosophy, and I'm halfway through The Savage Anomaly right now)Joel Gliddenhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17537995617381460013noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31783628.post-22690122252259653642011-08-07T04:48:33.772-04:002011-08-07T04:48:33.772-04:00Thank you, and for the other texts on the blog that I discover now. Very interesting!Sonja Lavaerthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09491860617071999584noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31783628.post-45239959317340207082011-07-24T22:48:59.735-04:002011-07-24T22:48:59.735-04:00interesting! I had the same problem in very different cultural domain as part of my PhD research. I was talking about enthusiasts. Active enthusiasm as a function of meeting 'challenges' and producing 'know how'. Passive enthusiasm as an assumption of media-directed challenges and the reception of know-how. I used Weber's notion of charisma to describe the organisational structure of primarily passive enthusiast scenes arranged around spectacles.ignatioushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00230711476493427458noreply@blogger.com