I find myself coming back to one central question, that is at once political and philosophical. Previously on this blog I referred to the political dimension of this transformation as the constitution of a new episteme, a new standard for what counts as truth. This new standard appears primarily as the destruction of the old standards, as expertise of scientists are contested, and universities are under attack. This new episteme is not in itself a conscious program, and like many things it has multiple overlapping and contradictory conditions, encompassing both the assault on the expertise underlying the administrative state, the knowledge of scientists and experts, on one hand, and the proletarianization of the intellect of day to day life by the proliferation of artificial intelligence, on the other. These strategies often converge and overlap, but have different motivations and conditions. The primary point of their overlap is the way in which they elevate what Spinoza called the imagination about reason, above common notions. The truth of things is how they effect us, or how they effect certain people, if vaccines feel invasive and destructive then they must be, if America does not seem to be racist (to white people) then it isn't, if it seems like the machine is thinking, fully conscious and sentient, then it must be. It is an episteme the puts imagination above reason.
Thursday, August 13, 2026
We Think in Society: Notes on the Destruction of Colllective Intelligence
Saturday, August 01, 2026
Finite Dialectic, Part II: The Spinozist Dialectic Or, Remarks on a Comment by Macherey
Sometimes I waste time by thinking of classes that I will never get a chance to teach, classes that would be for graduate students (which we do not have at USM), or entail books which have yet to be translated, or classes that are just too long. One class that meets all three would be a class on the dialectic and vicissitudes, this class would focus on the attempt to to rethink that dialectic in twentieth century philosophy, texts would include Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason, Adorno's Negative Dialectics, Althusser's For Marx, Badiou's Theory of the Subject. That would just be the big ones. Of course it would help if this class was preceded by one on Hegel and Marx, and perhaps followed by a class on Deleuze, Foucault, and Derrida (to name a few). At this point it has become completely unmanageable. I have long since come to the conclusion that what is often presented as the conflict between postmodernism and Marxism, or whatever you'd like to call it, is perhaps best understood as a division between those who maintain the dialectic, with some changes, and those who depart from it.
Monday, July 20, 2026
Live Más, Comrades: Hegel, Marx, and the Dialectics of Diarrhea
The merit of Hegel's Elements of the Philosophy of Right lie less in its solutions, constitutional monarchy, than in the way it grasps the fundamental problem of modern politics. Politics does not begin with individuals in some kind of pre-political state of nature, or as some kind of undifferentiated raw material. Politics, the state, comes after the institutions of the family and civil society, and these institutions are not just functional elements of society, they are, foundational in shaping the perspectives and conflicts of politics. The social is the antechamber of the political.
Wednesday, July 01, 2026
Working Together: on Fischbach's Faire Ensemble (and the question of solidarity)
Sunday, June 07, 2026
We're All Starbuck*:The Barista as Worker and Cultural figure
Wednesday, June 03, 2026
Society is a Scam: On the Proliferation of Cons in Contemporary Life
When I was a kid we received a chain letter. It was sent to our house. It promised untold riches and bountiful luck if we sent money, I am a little unclear on the details, and warned of misfortune and calamity if we did not. I remember that it was adorned with all kinds of images from the world magic, strange symbols, evil eyes, and the like. It was absolutely fascinating. I also remember, a few years later, a friend of my father's bought a VCR from a shady looking fellow on the street. It seemed like a great deal, which reminds me of one of the first rules of cons, make the mark feel like he is in on it. When he got it home he opened the box to find a brick wrapped in a newspaper inside (VCRs used to be heavy). This were both scams, cons, and they seemed to be incredibly exotic and isolated incidents. My father must have told that VCR story at countless parties. Cons and scams were few and far between.
Wednesday, May 20, 2026
Discontinuity and Continuity: On Reading (and Rereading) Lazzarato
Philosophy is filled with famous breaks. The break between the young and mature Marx, the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and Logical Investigations, Heidegger's Kehre, Foucault's transition from archeology to genealogy. Sometimes such breaks are declared by the philosopher in question, other times they are discovered, or perhaps invented, by readers and interpreters who have no other way of making sense of a philosopher. Which means that breaks only become legible, only become visible, when enough people read them, or worry about how they fit together. I have often thought that those of us who write philosophy, or theory, should think about our own writing when we read others. I say this because I imagine that most of us do not have radical breaks, but odd intersections of continuity and discontinuity as we try to think about whatever in the world we try to think about.
Sunday, May 03, 2026
Structured and Structuring: Lordon and Éwanjé-Épée on Race and Class
Monday, April 20, 2026
Society Effects: Living in a Society from Marx to Spinoza (and back)
Something is amiss in society. Many people have noticed a seemingly recent tendency of people acting in such a way in public as to disregard the very presence of other people, listening to music without headphones, having facetime conversations in coffee shops (also without headphones), and so on. Perhaps all of this started with Covid, which exasperated the already existing social distancing of modern life (in the name of saving others), or perhaps it started with smart phones, which are perhaps the greatest anti-social technology since the automobile. Personally, I think that the increased anti-social tendency is in some ways a reaction to Covid, I think that the idea that we had to treat everyone, even employees as human beings in part generated some of the massive reaction against sociality as such that we are living through, but that is a digression you can follow the links to. Whatever the causes might be, the Hobbesian war of all against all seems to have trickled down into a series of ever frustrating micro-aggressions of everyday life.
Sunday, March 22, 2026
Revolutions in the Revolution: On Jaquet's Révolution Transclasses
Wednesday, February 11, 2026
Which Way Marxist-Spinozist? On Diefenbach's Spinoza in Post-Marxist Philosophy
One of the best pieces of advice I got in graduate school came from Warren Montag. He was visiting Binghamton University. We were talking about Spinoza and he said to me to the effect of reading Alexandre Matheron, Pierre Macherey, Pierre François Moreau, etc. was absolutely necessary for understanding Spinoza scholarship, and those books would never be translated into English. They were too big, five volumes in Macherey's case, and too niche of an audience. He told me I needed to get to work learning to read French. So I did.
Thursday, January 29, 2026
The State of Bias: Universality and Particularity in Politics
A few weeks ago I was trying to formulate a pithy little formulation for social media. It went something like this, "Political theory is a matter of determining which principle a polity should follow; political practice is a matter of interpreting a principle differently for one's followers." It did not quite work as a post no matter how I reworked it, but what I was trying to get at is the pervasive and unavoidable inconsistency of the relationship between principle and practice in contemporary politics. We have so-called "free speech warriors" who are very worried about the "chilling effects" on free speech by students who protest speakers, but have nothing at all to say about state governments banning the teaching of Plato, and a federal government that makes education funding contingent on universities promoting their agenda, and, more recently, we have defenders of the right to bear arms arguing that just carrying a gun is enough to justify a summary execution. All of this goes beyond hypocrisy. Since I could not get it to work in a few characters, I thought that I would reflect on it more here.
Thursday, January 22, 2026
The Tensions of Ideology: Marx and Machiavelli, Althusser and Gramsci
Wednesday, December 17, 2025
Living in Uncanny Valley: On the Forces and Relations of Production of AI
Monday, December 08, 2025
From Baruch to Benedictus and Back Again: On Gilah Kletenik's Sovereignty Disrupted
Michael Hardt's Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy was a formative book for me in graduate school. Formative in the sense that it shaped my reading of Deleuze, but also in that it shaped my idea of what a book on a philosopher could or should do. What impressed me about Michael's book way back then is that he did the necessary work to excavate some of the concepts underlying Deleuze's books, not just Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson, but also Dun Scotus and Hegel, while at the same time recognizing that Deleuze's work is not pointed towards the past, to its history, but to debates with such philosophers as Althusser and with such movements such as autonomy. It is rare to find a book that is equally comfortable discussing scholastics and Nanni Balestrini.
Saturday, November 08, 2025
The Becoming Real of Abstractions: In Memory of Paolo Virno
Wednesday, October 08, 2025
Interpreting a Changing World: Labor Power in Virno and Macherey
Friday, September 19, 2025
Profane Existence: Capital Goes from Woke to MAGA
Thursday, September 11, 2025
Capitalist Dogs II: Or, What Habit Makes in Smith and Marx
I remember a friend in graduate school saying that our task, at least when it came to writing dissertations, was to write something that a database could not produce. He was a bit ahead of the curve, this was sometime around the late nineties early two thousands. Databases could not write books then, but they are getting closer to it. Or, more to the point, a particular kind of academic monograph, the sort the traces the development of a concept in a single author oeuvre or a comparison of two thinkers, seems to be increasingly the kind of thing that a machine could write. That is the bad news. The good news, is that such monographs seemed useful to write, but never that fun to read in the first place. What if we could leave such books to the machines that generate them and consume them. What kind of writing should we do in the age of (seemingly) intelligent machines?



















